what the hell is a Packard

[Twitch1]

This is my Packard

[proudfordowner]

Originally Posted by Twitch1

This is my Packard

wow twitch you got some nice oldies

[Curt J]

And here is my 1939 Packard 1700 Series Touring Sedan

[IMG]img25.photobucket.com/albums/v76/astuteobserver/1939Packard1700SeriesTouringSedan.jpg[/IMG]

[GPFred]

I helped my father restore a 37 super-eight touring. Ended up selling it as the body was cracked and he couldn't fix that. Have a lot of good memories, for the most part, of going to various auto shows around the country to find parts and manuals, etc. I hated the process of restoring the chassis, a lot of rust to be ground off.

[MagicRat]

Nice cars. I regret the Packard that I let get away; a 1951 in unrestored, good driving condition, owned for 45 years by a church, for $1200.

[Ralph Marontate]

The cars produced in the 1930's were mostly family sedans or business coupes with some convertibles being offered. Sports cars came years later.
Before the WWII Packard had a loyal following. As the depression ebbed Packard needed to expand its market so in 1937 it brought out the 120 Series. A true Packard but priced to compete with more middle priced market cars which sold in far more numbers than Senior Packard's competition which were the Pierce Arrow, Cadillac, Imperial, and Lincoln.
Packard introduced the Clipper in 1941 and was an outstanding style leader. The 1951 and 1956 Packard models were styling sensations and had many engineering features like a reversible seat cushions, V-8 engine, Ultramatic transmission, and a motor driven load leveler.
In 1946 George Mason, Nash CEO, predicted the independents could not survive without consolidating. He wanted Nash, Packard, Studebaker, and Hudson to merge into one company, United Motors, to share parts and to each build for one market price segment. All four cars would be sold at each existing dealership and they would cover 100% of the price market.
No body listened all believing their new postwar models would win consumers over. They each had thier own great plans for the future but they were rooted in styling and design and that is only part of being viable.
They forgot the unions would be unwielding in their demands that they pay the same benfits as the "Big Three." To end or avoid a strike they gave in to the unions but it required taking money from engineering, designing, and dealership development.
Soon the dealer's losing money gave up thier franchise and the ones that stayed could not afford to modernize their operation.
As the number and quality of thier dealerships declined the Big Three opened scores of larger and more modern retail facilities.
GM Ford and Chrysler built cars in all price classes and reaped substantial savings in using the same parts across the various car lines.
The independents suffered with duplication of departments and using parts over far fewer cars. Their manufacturing, advertising, and sales costs were much higher making their break even production higher when compared to GM Ford or Chrysler. When the companies went out in the 1950's the unions blamed "weak management". The public bought their cars but not enough of them as the cost of doing business required more and more be built each year against a hopelessly shrinking market for other than the cars of GM, Ford, and Chrysler.
So in judging the Nash, Hudson, Packard, or Studebaker cars of that time remember their demise was due to economic pressures beyond the control of the managers, not the cars themselves, they were great.
Also know that from 1930 to 1950 the Big Three held a 90% market share, leaving only a 10% market share among the independents.
Auburn, Pierce Arrow, Reo, Continental, Marmon, Graham, Hupp, and Willys were forced out of the market by 1940 leaving only Nash, Hudson, Packard, and Studebaker as the last four independents.
After the war, with a pent up demand, Nash, Hudson, Packard, Studebaker, Willys, and newcomers Kaiser, and Frazier sold cars for a while but by the mid 1950's all the independents were all but done. In 1954 they had less than 4% of the market. Nash lived on as AMC until 1987.
Now GM. Ford, and Chrysler are battling for survival. Their 90% market share, they once had, is now at 49%. Union demands since the 1930's have forced upon them high wages, healthcare obligations, and retirement income burdens, and profit sharing.
Regarding profit sharing, I always felt if someone wanted profits of the company they would purchase shares in it.
Unions also believe the managers of a company are way overpaid and get obscene bonuses. Well, let the workers form and run their own car company. They can then distribute the profits to everybody and be as generous to themselves in benefits as they want.
Will the unions wake up to the realities of the 2007 market and curb their demands or destroy GM, Ford, and Chrysler by demanding benefits and wages affordable in the last century when foreign competition did not exist?
The car companies future is in the hands of the union and that future is independent of the cars the companies offer. Unrealistic demands by the unions will determine the fate of GM, Ford, and Chrysler as the independents car makers of the last century found out.
As someone once said, "Those who don't know history are bound to repeat it"

[CoriolisSTORM]

Originally Posted by Ralph Marontate

The cars produced in the 1930's were mostly family sedans or business coupes with some convertibles being offered. Sports cars came years later.
Before the WWII Packard had a loyal following. As the depression ebbed Packard needed to expand its market so in 1937 it brought out the 120 Series. A true Packard but priced to compete with more middle priced market cars which sold in far more numbers than Senior Packard's competition which were the Pierce Arrow, Cadillac, Imperial, and Lincoln.
Packard introduced the Clipper in 1941 and was an outstanding style leader. The 1951 and 1956 Packard models were styling sensations and had many engineering features like a reversible seat cushions, V-8 engine, Ultramatic transmission, and a motor driven load leveler.
In 1946 George Mason, Nash CEO, predicted the independents could not survive without consolidating. He wanted Nash, Packard, Studebaker, and Hudson to merge into one company, United Motors, to share parts and to each build for one market price segment. All four cars would be sold at each existing dealership and they would cover 100% of the price market.
No body listened all believing their new postwar models would win consumers over. They each had thier own great plans for the future but they were rooted in styling and design and that is only part of being viable.
They forgot the unions would be unwielding in their demands that they pay the same benfits as the "Big Three." To end or avoid a strike they gave in to the unions but it required taking money from engineering, designing, and dealership development.
Soon the dealer's losing money gave up thier franchise and the ones that stayed could not afford to modernize their operation.
As the number and quality of thier dealerships declined the Big Three opened scores of larger and more modern retail facilities.
GM Ford and Chrysler built cars in all price classes and reaped substantial savings in using the same parts across the various car lines.
The independents suffered with duplication of departments and using parts over far fewer cars. Their manufacturing, advertising, and sales costs were much higher making their break even production higher when compared to GM Ford or Chrysler. When the companies went out in the 1950's the unions blamed "weak management". The public bought their cars but not enough of them as the cost of doing business required more and more be built each year against a hopelessly shrinking market for other than the cars of GM, Ford, and Chrysler.
So in judging the Nash, Hudson, Packard, or Studebaker cars of that time remember their demise was due to economic pressures beyond the control of the managers, not the cars themselves, they were great.
Also know that from 1930 to 1950 the Big Three held a 90% market share, leaving only a 10% market share among the independents.
Auburn, Pierce Arrow, Reo, Continental, Marmon, Graham, Hupp, and Willys were forced out of the market by 1940 leaving only Nash, Hudson, Packard, and Studebaker as the last four independents.
After the war, with a pent up demand, Nash, Hudson, Packard, Studebaker, Willys, and newcomers Kaiser, and Frazier sold cars for a while but by the mid 1950's all the independents were all but done. In 1954 they had less than 4% of the market. Nash lived on as AMC until 1987.
Now GM. Ford, and Chrysler are battling for survival. Their 90% market share, they once had, is now at 49%. Union demands since the 1930's have forced upon them high wages, healthcare obligations, and retirement income burdens, and profit sharing.
Regarding profit sharing, I always felt if someone wanted profits of the company they would purchase shares in it.
Unions also believe the managers of a company are way overpaid and get obscene bonuses. Well, let the workers form and run their own car company. They can then distribute the profits to everybody and be as generous to themselves in benefits as they want.
Will the unions wake up to the realities of the 2007 market and curb their demands or destroy GM, Ford, and Chrysler by demanding benefits and wages affordable in the last century when foreign competition did not exist?
The car companies future is in the hands of the union and that future is independent of the cars the companies offer. Unrealistic demands by the unions will determine the fate of GM, Ford, and Chrysler as the independents car makers of the last century found out.
As someone once said, "Those who don't know history are bound to repeat it"

I love you for posting that brilliant essay, others will argue with me, but I believe it is true.

[mark glicker]

Looks like they are finally razing the old Packard plant.